This post is a second excerpt from a doctoral dissertation entitled, The Removal of Racial Criteria from the Immigration Policies of Canada and New Zealand: An Application of the Policy Regime Model to the Politics of Immigration Policy Change – written and successfully defended by Dennis D. Paglinawan (2010) at the University of Auckland, New Zealand.
Like Canada, New Zealand’s immigration policy underwent shifts in its immigration policy over time, and by 1987 all references to race as a criterion for admissibility to New Zealand were removed – liberalising immigration in legislation, policy and in practice. What follows below is an explanation that a shift in New Zealand’s Organisation of Government – that is, the arrangement of government institutions within the policy development process – and the eventual policy shift, suggests that that an immigration policy regime was in place and that it underwent regime change. The implications are theoretical with the assessment of the Policy Regime Model (Model) by Carter A. Wilson, and whether it is a useful guide to help explain how public policies change over time.
The Model by Wilson posits that a policy regime is made up of a policy, power arrangement, policy paradigm and an organisation of government. In this case, the Model was assessed by applying it to the area of New Zealand immigration policy, revealing that an immigration policy regime was in place, that the policy regime underwent change as evidenced by shifts in government organisation and immigration policy, and that the Model is a useful theoretical guide when analysing policy change and how politics drives policy to change.
New Zealand Organisation of Government and Policy Shift: Apparent Immigration Policy Regime Change
Like the post on the Canadian Organisation and Policy Shift, this discussion deals with New Zealand’s organisation of government and policy shift – outlining that over time there was change in the immigration policy regime. In subsequent chapters of the dissertation from which this writing originates, the discussion explains how and why other stages of New Zealand’s policy regime change unfolded in the period 1945-1987. New Zealand immigration policies, legislation, and the organisation of government involved in the policy process changed in the post-WWII era to 1987, which makes the assertion that an old immigration policy regime dissolved over time and a new one emerged reasonable.
Policy Regime Change
The Immigration Restriction Act (IRA) of 1921 and its amendments in 1931 and 1961 restricted non-European immigration to New Zealand. The IRA 1931 restricted specifically non-British immigration, essentially protecting free entry for Britons, but it permitted ministerial discretion to make exceptions to these provisions (Greif 1995). The IRA 1961 made the restrictions applicable to all potential immigrants, rather than just non-white, non-British or non-Irish nationals. Specifically, all immigrants required permits before landing in New Zealand, except for Australians because they were entitled to unrestricted movement to New Zealand as early as 1840. However, permits were a mere formality for the British and Irish, who received permits upon arriving in New Zealand (Beaglehole 2006 in Phillips, ed.). The New Zealand Government consolidated these restrictions and maintained the minister’s discretionary provisions by passing the 1964 Immigration Act. Even though officials throughout these years stated that New Zealand’s legislation had no provisions restricting immigration based on race, ethnicity or nationality, provisions under the 1964 Act were the bases for immigration policy that maintained the traditional-source country criterion and preferences for white immigrants (Brawley 1993; Martin 1996; Trlin 1986 in Trlin and Spoonley, eds.). In brief, the 1964 Act was restrictive with provisions that included:
- Part I, Sections 3-6, which listed classes of people as prohibited immigrants, including mentally defective persons, people with diseases specified at any time by the Governor General, persons convicted and imprisoned or detained for a period of one year or more, and previously deported persons; and cites the power of the Governor General to exempt people from the list;
- Part II, Section 13, which cited the requirement for every person to obtain a permit to enter New Zealand; Sections 14(5), which cited that overstaying beyond the terms of temporary permits was a prosecutable offence under the Act; 14(6) cites that the minister may revoke such permits; and Section 19, which grants ministerial discretion to make exceptions to the requirements for permits;
- Part III, Section 20, which cited provisions for the deportation of prohibited immigrants and persons convicted of breaching the Act, and cited the right to appeal to the minister against deportation orders;
- Part IV, Section 22, which cited provisions to deport people threatening national security, by way of terrorism or subversion, for example; Section 22(a) to 22(g), which cited provisions for the enforcement of deportation orders, and provisions allowing for appeals to tribunals and the courts; and
- Part VI, which included general provisions to allow summary convictions, fines, imprisonment, and deportations; allowed the discretionary use of powers by immigration officers when administering provisions of the Act; permitted the minister to delegate any or all of his power; and allowed the Governor General to make regulations any time under the Act (New Zealand, Immigration Act 1964).
With these provisions in the Act exercised with ministerial discretion, until 1987, the New Zealand Government ‘…maintained a ‘whites only’ immigration policy’ (Brawley 1993). Successive Governments implemented regulations within these legislative provisions, and gave preference to white immigrants from traditional-source countries.
Like the 1964 Act, the Immigration Act of 1987 and subsequent regulations did not refer specifically to an individual’s inadmissibility according to race, ethnicity or nationality, though they maintained provisions for the exercise of ministerial and bureaucratic discretion. This discretion included allowing officials to grant temporary and residency permits and visas, and to revoke or refuse the granting of these documents (New Zealand, Immigration Act 1987, Immigration Regulations 1987). This is because the 1986 Immigration Policy Review, which was the basis for the Act, stated government policy had moved away from automatic discrimination, and would not exercise legislative provisions with regard to racial criteria or preferred-source countries. The Government would select ‘…new immigrants…based on criteria of personal merit without discrimination on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, sex or marital status, religion or ethical belief’ (Burke 1986). These legislative and policy differences reflect, not just that an old immigration policy regime dissolved and that a new one emerged but also, a shift in the way the Government viewed race in immigration. As subsequent posts related to this piece demonstrate, this shift occurred because of changes in several aspects of the Government’s immigration policy paradigm. In addition to shifts in the policy paradigm, other stages of policy regime change emerged, including those resembling legitimacy crises and shifts in the power arrangement. The point here is that New Zealand’s immigration policy regime had shifted in the period 1945- 1987, and that the new policy and legislation reflect this shift. However, another indication that this change eventuated over time was the emergence of a new organisation of government or institutional arrangement involved in the policy process. The shift in the organisation of government accompanied change in policy and represents the final stage of policy regime change, and thus requires discussion.
Organisation of Government and Shift
Similar to the Canadian experience discussed in the previous post, New Zealand’s immigration policy regime in 1987 consisted of an organisation of government, which was the institutional arrangement involved in the policy process, and its formation represented the last stage of policy regime change. Diagram 3 illustrates the arrangement of institutions involved in the policy process of removing racial discrimination in New Zealand immigration policy. These institutions and organisations facilitated information flow among them and ultimately to Cabinet where final policy decisions emerged.
From the diagram, it is possible to identify phases or stages of a basic policy cycle. For example, it is possible to discern that policy outputs from Cabinet to the minister of labour, which flowed to the Department of Labour and then to its immigration division. The division implemented policy that had impacts on societal interests. Organised interests had several avenues for feedback and input to Cabinet where final evaluation of policy, problem identification, alternative solutions, decision-making and policy formulation took place. However, the diagram does not necessarily depict a comprehensive policy cycle. The Model does not dictate that the institutional arrangement necessarily reflect a complete policy cycle. The Model posits that changes to the institutions involved in the policy process indicate a change to the policy regime. The changes to this arrangement, noted in the diagram and discussed in this section, are consistent with the principle of the Model regarding the expansion of the decision-making arena. This consistency with the Model is to the extent that over time the sources and flow of information to Cabinet expanded, which was possible due to the dissolution of some institutions, and the greater engagement or presence of others in the policy area.
The diagram shows the various phases of a basic policy cycle wherein information flowed from several sources in the institutional arrangement, and the changes that unfolded in this arrangement incrementally over the period in question, including the information flow between institutions that gained inclusion in, and became involved with, the policy area over time, which includes permanent state institutions, quasi-state institutions, as well as non-state organisation within a pluralist society, and thus they deserve separate discussion later in this section. However, to begin, a brief discussion on the House of Representatives, Cabinet, the Department of Labour and its Immigration Service, and other permanent state structures is necessary.
Diagram 3: Institutions in Organisation of Government, reflecting changes that transpired in New Zealand over the period 1945-1987. Similar to the Canadian organisation of government discussed in the previous post, blue-coloured objects indicate permanent state structures, some of which underwent internal change or reorganisation. Green-coloured objects represent some non-state and quasi-state structures that changed and expanded the institutional arrangement, which represented policy regime change.
House of Representatives, Cabinet, Department of Labour, Immigration Service, Courts and Plural Interests
In addition to its lawmaking function, New Zealand’s House of Representatives is where debates on immigration policy can emerge. During the fourth Labour Government, representatives on both sides of the House presented their perspectives against the prevailing policy and legislation, which helped to reshape the prevailing policy paradigm, and ultimately provided feedback to Cabinet to change immigration policy.
Although Cabinet shares lawmaking functions with the House, only Cabinet can pass public policies. When Cabinet announced the policy to remove New Zealand’s traditional-source country preferences from immigration in 1986, the decision was a policy output that the labour and immigration minister was responsible for implementing. The minister advised the Department of Labour to implement and administer policies through its immigration service. With the exception of the years 1938-1946, the Department had jurisdiction over the immigration division since 1931 (Martin 1996), except for immigration control, which the customs department handled until 1951.
The immigration service implemented policies under the department through operational regulations. The implementation of policy created impacts over time that society felt, and policies that various organised societal groups supported or opposed. Whether members of New Zealand society supported or opposed immigration policy, their feedback relating to policy impacts emerged and could flow in four possible directions:
- to the Immigration Service and the Department of Labour;
- to the Immigration Service and then to the courts;
- to the House of Representatives through MPs; or
- to a minister in Cabinet directly.
Therefore, information from societal groups with interests in immigration flowed through state institutions and then to Cabinet. This information flow was in addition to information that flowed through other state institutions, such as other departments or ministries with varied interest in immigration, including those related to foreign affairs, finance, culture and law enforcement or national security.
The first avenue of feedback that existed was through to the Immigration Service. This avenue extended to the department, to its minister and then to Cabinet. Negative feedback by plural societal interests had a second avenue, which was to the courts, through which legal challenges to policy or legislation could unfold. When the courts were involved, policy feedback took the form of legal decisions for Cabinet to consider. The third avenue was one through which interest groups could also provide feedback to the House. As alluded to earlier, parliamentarians could engage in dialogue and debate, and then could forward immigration concerns to Cabinet. Members of the House, some of whom were cabinet ministers, could also raise issues related to immigration in committees on which they sat. For example, in the later years of the fourth Labour Government, the committee where immigration issues prevailed was the Government Caucus Committee on Immigration and Justice. This committee then provided feedback to Cabinet on various immigration issues including annual quotas and the appropriateness of the traditional-source country criterion.
Finally, the fourth feedback avenue involved direct lobbying to ministers. Interest groups affected by immigration policy were open to lobby Minister of Immigration, Kerry Burke, or Prime Minister David Lange during the fourth Labour Government. Direct ministerial lobbying was a matter of course when one’s representative in Parliament was a cabinet minister. In each of the four scenarios, societal interest groups could identify what they believed to be policy problems in immigration, were open to compete with one another to gain the attention of the Government, and could potentially set the immigration policy agenda. Ultimately, these avenues of policy feedback reached Cabinet where there was further problem identification, policy formation, and final policy decision-making.
Other Permanent Government Institutions outside Immigration Policy Area
While the minister of labour and immigration oversaw the Department of Labour and the Immigration Service, other cabinet ministers may have had reasons to provide their own perspectives, input or feedback to Cabinet regarding immigration. For example, the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, which provided feedback to Cabinet as well, had feedback from the Pacific Island Affairs Advisory Council, which Immigration Minister Kerry Burke noted to be helpful in providing reports to him for the 1986 Immigration Policy Review (Burke 1986, p. 4). The Department of External Affairs prior to 1970, and then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs afterwards, identified policy problems related to immigration at their overseas posts, and provided feedback to Cabinet through the minister. In addition, one of the main concerns by foreign affairs officials was the operational difficulties and the negative image other states could associate with New Zealand due to prevailing restrictive immigration policies.
Finally, Treasury reported to the minister of finance who wielded much influence in Cabinet during the years of the fourth Labour Government to further the party’s economic-reform agenda, because whilst the department of labour and its responsibilities over labour and immigration were important, the Government’s economic reforms took priority. In fact, policy recommendations to Cabinet, whether the policy was in the area of immigration or not, could not impede the economic reforms. Ministers had to ensure that any feedback or recommendation “wasn’t in conflict with government policy, with government’s economic policy, because ministers who tried to [present] papers that were in conflict with the freeing-up of the economy usually found that they didn’t get very far” (Burke 7 September 2007). Therefore, feedback from institutions had to facilitate the economic reforms, or at the very least not impede the progression of the reforms Cabinet pursued. Immigration policy was a tool to help achieve economic growth that needed to complement and reflect a consideration of the fourth Labour Government’s economic agenda.
To the extent that other state institutions had varying yet relevant interests in immigration, including and discussing them as permanent state institutions in the shift in organisation of government is necessary. The permanent state institutions in Diagram 3 had changed throughout the post-WWII era, most obviously through major power shifts in government leadership. Suffice it to say, after shifts in government leadership, Parliament and Cabinet underwent dissolution and then recreation, followed by some reorganisation of the bureaucracy. The reorganisation of each of the bureaucratic structures in Diagram 3, much less all the state bureaucracy, is beyond the scope of, and direct relevance to, this discussion. However, it is important to note the major changes to the labour department responsible for the immigration division.
In 1940, for reasons related to WWII, the Government took emergency war measures and transferred employment and immigration functions to the National Service Department’s National Employment Service (Martin 1996). After WWII, in 1947, the Government sought to achieve full employment by increasing immigration levels. For this reason, it created the Department of Labour and Employment, a decision that involved the consolidation of the labour department and the National Employment Service, which included a small, fledgling immigration division (Martin 1996). By 1951, the Government transferred all remaining immigration functions, as accorded under the 1920 Immigration Act, including immigration controls, to the new department (Martin 1996). By 1954, the decision passed to reorganise the labour department, to still include immigration and employment as functions but, to rename it the Department of Labour (Martin 1996), which has remained the state structure responsible for immigration in New Zealand. As clarified later on, this decision reflected a continued commitment by the Government to achieve full employment and economic growth, and to use immigration as a means to these ends. Next in this section is a discussion of the structures in Diagram 3 that engaged in various stages of the policy process, and expanded the institutional arrangement through which information flowed to Cabinet over time.
Organised Societal Interests, Courts, Quasi-State Structures, and Immigration Advisory Council
I argue that organised societal interests had always existed within the institutional arrangement involved in immigration policy. Specifically, considerations of business interests, and to a lesser degree organised labour groups, dominated the Government’s immigration agenda in the period 1945-1987, because of their relevance to the labour market. I also posit that ethnic-humanitarian groups had grown to become better organised, more dedicated and vocal in immigration. However, because of the multitude of fragmented ethnic-humanitarian groups to consider individually, in addition to business and organised labour organisations, it is difficult to identify how each and all had changed with reference to the Model’s element of organisation of government. Notwithstanding this impracticality, it is reasonable to identify examples wherein these groups’ political activity and mobilisation changed the organisation of government to expand the policymaking arena, and ultimately facilitated changes to the Government’s policy paradigm in relation to issues of race, equality, humanitarianism, and economic growth. For example, the Chinese community had gained more support from the church groups after WWII, and they advocated for liberal immigration provisions for refugees from China. In addition, even before the start of WWII, church groups had combined their efforts to assist Jews and other displaced people from Europe. Eventually, these efforts led to the formation of the National Council of Churches, which subsequently was instrumental in the admission of waves of refugees into New Zealand during the Cold War. The Chinese and the Jews lobbied and helped to expand public awareness about the need to expand immigration and refugee assistance for humanitarian reasons. Business interests, some of which were better organised relative to other interest groups, maintained if not elevated their dominant influence in immigration. An example would be the formation of the National Development Council in 1969 and the Business Round Table in 1976, which represented ‘consolidation’ and ‘new creation’, as per one of the principles of the Model regarding organisation and policy shift – that organisation and policy shifts are changes in the organisation of the policy implementation process and in policy goals, and can be of four types, including dissolution/recreation, consolidation, internal reorganisation, and new creation. In short, these points suggest that they constituted part of organised plural-societal interests as depicted in Diagram 3. Eventually, the mobilisation of these groups led to the engagement of the courts and the creation of quasi-state or statutory bodies in the policy process.
The courts were instrumental in New Zealand immigration policy change, because their involvement included the prosecution of individuals charged with violating provisions of prevailing immigration legislation. In addition, societal challenges to legislative provisions led to court decisions that overturned previous convictions and raised the issue of inhumane treatment by the state toward some migrants. The Lesa case in 1982, on which I will elaborate later, illustrates this point. The presence and engagement of the courts in specific cases, their judicial review of and the Government’s adjustments to, prevailing legislation and policy, suggests that the organisation of government had expanded, and hence the inclusion of the courts in Diagram 3.
Quasi-state institutions in this period included the Race Relations Conciliator’s Office, and the Human Rights Commission. Through the passage of the Race Relations Act in 1971, the Government established the Race Relations Conciliator’s Office and the procedures to investigate charges of disparate treatment based on race, including charges against systemic discrimination by state institutions and officials. Similarly, in order to investigate and monitor allegations of discriminatory practices that violated human rights and equality, the Government passed the Human Rights Commission Act, which established the Human Rights Commission in 1977. The Government passed the Race Relations Act in 1971 in order to ratify the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Then, the passage of the Human Rights Commission Act in 1977 upheld and promoted the rights of a wider section of society against discrimination including on the grounds of sex, marital status and religious or ethical belief. In addition, the Government passed the 1977 Act, partly to give effect to New Zealand’s recognition of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). These two statutory bodies, the Race Relations Conciliator’s Office and the Human Rights Commission, provided societal interests with avenues through which they could advocate for liberal changes to, and protest against prevailing discrimination in, immigration policy. Furthermore, these organisations provided feedback to the Government on immigration issues, including the Conciliator’s report on the discriminatory targeting of Pacific Island overstayers, and the 1983 Immigration Bill. The engagement by these two organisations in New Zealand’s immigration policy process in this period justifies their inclusion in Diagram 3.
The final body to discuss is the Immigration Advisory Council (IAC). Until its dissolution in 1979, the ‘Government look[ed] to the Immigration Advisory Council as the supreme body on immigration policy …’ These were the words of Assistant Secretary of Labour, and Chairman of the IAC in 1975, K. Coveney according to the IAC’s minutes of 3 July 1975 (IAC 1975). The Government created the IAC in 1947, and although some administrations such as the Holland Ministry in the 1950s used the IAC less often, its advice to Cabinet was influential to change several aspects of the immigration policy paradigm over time. The IAC advised Cabinet on immigration, particularly on economic matters. However, over time it advised on other aspects of immigration, including the utility and effects of the traditional-source country criterion on policy outcomes. Therefore, the IAC’s years of providing influential information to Cabinet, its eventual dissolution, the changes in the way the IAC viewed immigration that coincided with the increasing influence of societal organisations during the 1970s, and the resulting changes in the institutional arrangement justifies the inclusion of the IAC in Diagram 3.
Concluding Comments
The Model states that shifts in the organisation of government can reflect four possible types of change to organisations within the institutional arrangement. In the post-WWII era, Parliament, Cabinet and their committees underwent dissolution and recreation due to power shifts in government leadership. The labour department and the immigration division changed through consolidation, reorganisation, and new creation, which ultimately placed the immigration function within the newly formed Department of Labour. Organised societal interests changed to the extent that when churches assisted groups like the Chinese, the change represented consolidation. The formation of the National Council of Churches represented consolidation and new creation; and so too did the notable organisational changes of business interests during their efforts to pursue increased immigration. The conception of the Race Relations Conciliator’s Office and the Human Rights Commission represented new creation. Finally, the presence of the IAC in the organisation of government represented change in the post-WWII era that included new creation from its establishment in 1947 and then dissolution after the Government disbanded it in 1979.
These eventual changes to the organisation of government, as depicted in Diagram 3, will be clearer in the chapters that follow. The chapters regarding stressors, challenges to the legitimacy of the Government’s prevailing views on immigration policy, power shifts, as well as policy paradigm shifts, explain the facilitation of incremental changes in the organisation of government, which according to the Model signifies that a new immigration policy regime in New Zealand had emerged. More specifically, subsequent posts illustrate the flow of information from the bureaucracy to ministers in Cabinet, the debate and dialogue between elected officials in the House and committees over immigration policy, the plurality of societal interest groups that asserted their views to change immigration policy, and discuss the courts that rendered legal decisions. Consistent with the Model, these dynamics just mentioned eventuated because of stressors, which created environments conducive to immigration policy regime change, as discussed in the following posts.
References
Beaglehole, A. 2006. ‘Immigration Regulation’ in Phillips, J. ed., Settler and Migrant Peoples of New Zealand. Auckland: David Bateman Ltd., pp. 52-59.
Burke, K., 1986. Review of Immigration Policy, August 1986. Wellington: Government Printer.
Burke, K., 2007. Telephone Interview, 7 September.
Brawley, S., 1993. ‘No “White Policy” in NZ: Fact and Fiction in New Zealand’s Asian Immigration Record, 1946-1978’, New Zealand Journal of History, 27 (1), pp. 16-36.
Greif, S.W., 1995. Immigration and National Identity in New Zealand: One People, Two Peoples, Many Peoples? Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press.
Martin, J.E., 1996. Holding the Balance: A History of New Zealand’s Department of Labour, 1891- 1995. Christchurch: Canterbury University Press.
New Zealand, 1965. ‘Immigration Act 1964’ in The Statutes of New Zealand, 1964, Vol. 1. Wellington: Government Printer.
Trlin, A.D. 1986. ‘New Zealand’s Immigration Policy in the Early 1980s’ in Trlin, A.D. and Spoonley, P. eds., New Zealand and International Migration: A Digest and Bibliography, Number 1. Palmerston North: Massey University Printery, pp. 1-21.
